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Abstract This paper identifies factors that encourage or reduce pick-pocketing at 
underground rail stations through a case study analysis of the London Underground. 
Negative binomial Poisson regression models found possible predictor variables of 
pick-pocketing selected from the internal characteristics of stations, and features of their 
nearby surroundings. Factors that increased risk were those associated with; greater 
congestion inside stations including lifts, waiting rooms and fewer platforms; and, 
increased levels of accessibility near stations, more paths and roads. Features that 
reduced risk were those likely to encourage detection and guardianship; stations with 
more personal validators, staffing levels, and shop rentals; and, the presence of more 
domestic buildings nearby. Station type was also influential; those that were ‘attractors’ 
of crime and those frequently used by tourists were at greater risk. The findings suggest 
a transmission of theft risk between the internal settings of underground stations and 
their nearby surroundings.  
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Introduction  
This study analyses theft of personal property offences on the London Underground 
(LU). This major mass transit system carries over 1,000 million passenger per year, and 
experienced 5,063 theft offences in financial year 2011/2012 (BTP, 2013). Whilst this 
represents a rate of only four thefts per million passenger journeys, theft is a key offence 
type on the LU. Indeed, as a proportion of all offences, over half were for theft. This 
paper examines a specific type of theft offence, what Smith (2008) termed stealth 
crimes, for example pick-pocketing. It excludes snatching and other theft types. For 
these stealth offences, victims are often unaware items are stolen, only discovering them 
missing at a later date, on transit journeys usually somewhere else on the transit line. As 
the location of many of these thefts is unknown, an innovative methodology is used to 
better estimate the locations of theft on transit stations. This is termed Interstitial Crime 
Analysis (ICA) and is described in detail by Newton et al (2014).  
This research builds on the Newton et al (2014) study into the spatial patterns of theft 
on the LU that found; theft was concentrated at a small number of stations; positive 
correlations existed between theft at three settings, ‘below ground’, ‘at’ stations; and, in 
‘nearby’ surroundings of stations; and, that these correlations were most prominent at 
peak travel times. A key question that arose in the previous study which this paper 
attempts to address is: What are the explanations for these patterns of theft observed on 
the LU? 
This paper aims to identify predictor variables of theft on the LU at two distinct 
settings; within underground rail stations; and, in the nearby surroundings of stations. 
 
 
The key questions are; what predictor variables influence theft on the LU; and, is there 
any evidence of a transmission of theft risk between these internal and external settings?  
Theoretical explanations and previous studies (for overviews see Smith and Clarke, 
2000; Smith and Cornish, 2006; Newton, 2014) suggest three possible inter-related 
explanations for theft on transit systems; the presence of transit systems are themselves 
a system cause of theft; stations act as generators/attractors of theft; and, stations serve 
as a type of ‘risky facility’.  
Theoretical background 
The presence of transit systems may help shape the crime patterns of urban areas (Piza 
and Kennedy, 2003). Stations act as a focal point, the entrances and exit to the system, 
and the interchanges connecting different journeys. During peak travel times they 
concentrate a number of persons together in small spaces, at other times stations are 
isolated with fewer users. The presence of a transit station may create opportunities for 
offending at particular locations at certain times of the day. Therefore, the first question 
is whether the transit system itself creates opportunities for theft, driven by passenger 
movement and passenger journeys.  
Attractors and generators 
Stations may serve as attractors or generators of crime (Brantingham and Brantingham, 
1995). Crime attractors are places offenders visit due to known expected opportunities 
for crime, for example liquor stores, pawn brokers, drug-treatment centres, homeless 
shelters, and liquor clubs (Rengert et al, 2005; McCord et al, 2007). Generators are 
settings whereby a number of persons are channelled together, resulting in unplanned 
 
 
but favourable conditions for crime, for example high schools, football stadiums and 
parks (Groff and McCord 2012). Kurland (2013) states for football stadiums (although 
this could equally apply to underground stations) that they may act as; mostly a crime 
attractor; mostly a crime generator; or simultaneously as a crime generator/crime 
attractor. However, attractors and generators are difficult to quantify, a point returned to 
later in this paper. The second question to be explored is therefore whether stations act 
as an attractor or generator of theft, or both?  
Stations may also act as ‘risky facilities’, a term used to describe similar land features 
such as bars or hospitals, or in this case underground rail stations, whereby, most of the 
crime at these facilities occurs at only a minority of them (Eck et al, 2007). 
Explanations for the presence of risky facilities are centred on the mobility of urban 
areas, determined by the geometry and patterns of crime (Brantingham and 
Brantingham, 1993). Offenders and victims have daily movement patterns termed 
routine activities (Felson and Cohen, 1980), and movement is concentrated at favourite 
activity nodes, for example based on work, leisure, or recreation activities. Risky 
facilities are often located at these activity nodes. Travel between nodes occurs along 
distinct routes (paths) constrained by obstacles (barriers) to movement, and offenders 
increase knowledge of suitable opportunities to offend during their routine activities. On 
transit systems there are may be certain nodes (stations) and paths (railway lines) that 
users favour. It is suggested that the presence or absence of certain features along these 
paths and at these nodes may encourage or deter offenders. A third question is therefore; 
what characteristics of stations and their nearby surroundings influence opportunities 
for theft? 
 
 
All three theoretical standpoints propose that high crime stations will be located in high 
crime areas, and low crime stations in low crime areas. This suggests crime is a product 
of its wider environment, and Block and Block (2000) usefully term these nearby 
surroundings the ‘environs’ of rapid transit. However, the research evidence here is 
unclear. Not all stations in high crime areas experience high crime levels. Some studies 
suggest a well-designed transit station can insulate itself from crime in the wider 
environment (Clarke et al, 1996; La Vigne 1996); others argue high crime stations are 
situated in high crime areas (Block and Block, 2000; Loukaitou-Sideris et al, 2002; 
Ceccato et al, 2013, Newton et al, 2014). Few studies have examined this explicitly for 
theft. La Vigne’s (1996) study found Part I offences (including the subcategory of theft) 
were not correlated with their external environment. However, theft could not be 
isolated here from other Part I crimes thus findings here for theft alone may be skewed 
by other crime types.   
Bowers (2013) examined whether crime risk transfers between the internal and external 
settings of risky facilities, and hypothesised risky facilities may act; as radiators of 
crime, the primary driver of risk radiating risk to the nearby surroundings; or, as 
absorbers of crime, soaking up crime from the surrounding environment. The study 
found risky facilities were more likely to act as radiators although did not include transit 
facilities in the analysis. Underground stations are a unique type of risky facility, a 
‘true’ radiator, connected by underground lines (pipes) that can be entered and exited 
from their external environs, or underground via a different station. A final research 
question is therefore whether there is a transfer of theft risk between the internal settings 
of underground stations and their surrounding environs, and vice versa. The following 
research questions were devised for this study:  
 
 
1. What are the predictor variables of theft on the LU? 
2. Is theft on the LU influenced by both internal design characteristics (within 
stations) and the external settings near to stations (external features)? 
3. Is there evidence of a transmission of theft risk between the internal settings of 
underground rail stations and their nearby external environs? 
Theft on transit systems 
Theft on underground stations has been shown to be non-uniform in time and space, 
concentrated at particular stations and peak times of the day (Loukatiou-Sideris et al, 
2002; Ceccato et al, 2013; Newton, 2014). Theft concentrates at busy stations during 
the early morning and afternoon rush hour periods. However, high passenger numbers 
and nearby high theft levels alone do not provide a sufficient explanation of theft. 
Additional predictor variables present both inside stations (internal characteristics) and 
in their nearby surroundings (external features) are required to better explain theft levels 
on underground transit systems, and previous literature on potential mechanisms of theft 
on transit systems identified a number of possible predictor variables of theft.  
Newton et al (2014) summarised a number of mechanisms that may act as predictor 
variables for theft at transit stations. For this study, these are grouped into the following 
classifications; high densities of people clustered together in small spaces; a lack of user 
knowledge about the system; the ease of passenger distraction; the accessibility and ease 
of access to and exit from stations; anonymity of offenders; barriers to movement 
between and within stations; and, staffing, protection and guardianship. These are not 
mutually exclusive, for example, high passenger density offers natural anonymity and 
reduced likelihood of detection. Moreover, individual predictor variables such as paid 
 
 
control gates, better lighting, or the presence of CCTV may impact on more than one of 
the above classifications.   
Stations may act as a crime generator or attractor although few have attempted to 
quantify the differences between these. Perhaps a useful starting point here is offered by 
Clarke and Eck (2003); crime generators are defined as having a high count of crime but 
a low rate per population; and crime attractors as experiencing a high count and rate of 
crime, a point returned to later in this paper.  
This is further complicated as additional features near to a station may also be a crime 
attractor or generator. Whilst some studies have examined attractors and generators near 
to risky facilities (Groff et al, 2010), few have examined this specifically for transit 
stations. Bernasco and Block (2011) investigated the influence of crime generators, 
crime attractors, and offender anchor points on robbery near to rail stations and found; 
pull factors such as crime generators increased the transient population of an area and 
therefore increased risk; blocks with attractors/generators of crime elevated crime risk 
in adjacent blocks; and, push factors such as the presence and proximity of a motivated 
offender’s anchor point increased risk. Again, the authors did not distinguish between 
features that served as crime attractors and those that were crime generators.  
Groff and McCord (2012) examined generators around parks and found; elevated levels 
of crime near to parks increased risk inside parks; that both the internal and external 
settings of parks influenced risk; and that features serving as activity generators inside 
parks reduced crime. Parks with more activity generators, generally the larger parks, 
had more legitimate users, more capable guardians, and therefore less crime. However, 
not all activity generators increase legitimate users. At transit stations more activity 
 
 
generators may not reduce theft. Increased numbers of users may actually increase 
targets but also disguise offenders. Loukatiou-Sideris et al (2002) term this a second 
level population density; as passenger levels increase, a certain density (first level) may 
be reached that encourages some violent crimes; beyond this, even higher passenger 
densities (second level) may actually promote some lower level crimes such as pick-
pocketing.  
Outside of parks, Groff and McCord found increased levels of mixed land use near 
parks reduced crime levels by increasing ‘eyes on the street’, consistent with the work 
of Jacobs (1961). However as discussed by Browning et al (2010) mixed land use may 
also increase crime prevalence due to territorial impacts, reducing informal levels of 
social control, consistent with Newman (1973). For this paper land use near to stations 
will be tested as an external predictor variable of theft, as this may serve to increase or 
potentially reduce theft levels.  
Data and methodology 
This study uses data from a range of sources, including data on theft within and near to 
stations, and possible predictor variables of theft, both inside stations (internal 
characteristics) and near to stations (the external environment).  
Crime data 
On the LU, stations are policed by the British Transport Police (BTP) and their external 
environs by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and City of London Police (CoLP). 
Data was obtained from all three organisations for the 12 month period 1st April 2011 to 
31st March 2012 for the following codes; Home Office (HO) codes shoplifting (HO 
 
 
classification 46); theft person (HO classification 39); and theft other (HO Classification 
49); and BTP codes theft luggage (J02), theft personal property (J03), theft from the 
person (J04) and shoplifting (J22).  
Theft data was captured for the internal setting, within stations, and the external 
environs near to stations. For theft at stations, the BTP theft data was separated into 
thefts ‘at’ stations with a known location, and theft that happens as part of a transit 
journey (with an unknown location). The latter was measured using the ICA measure to 
estimate likely locations of underground theft during transit journeys. A 400m buffer 
zone around stations was used for the external environs near to stations, a distance 
shown from previous studies to be appropriate (Newton et al, 2014).  Additional crime 
data for other crime types which may influence theft levels were captured at census 
ward level as it was not available within the 400m buffer for this study.  
Interstitial Crime Analysis (ICA) 
A difficulty in analysing pick-pocketing offences is that time and location are often 
unknown; theft may have occurred at or between several stations traversed during a 
transit journey. The innovative ICA technique (Newton et al, 2014) generates 
probability estimates of the likely locations of theft on underground journeys using the 
following procedure. 
Taking a hypothetical model; if pick-pocketed passenger ‘X’ travels from station A to 
station C, and changed at station B, then there are five ‘sections’ of this journey where 
theft may have occurred (station A; segment A to B; station B; segment B to C; and 
station C). The risk at each of the five sections is assigned a value of 0.2. If a second 
victimised passenger ‘Y’ travels from station A to C and did not change at B the risk is 
 
 
0.25 at each section of the journey (station A; segment A to B; segment B to C; station 
C).  If passenger ‘Z’ travels from station A to B, the risk at each section is 0.33 (station 
A; segment A to B; and station B). The ICA then generates a cumulative risk for each 
station and for each segment, based on the possible pick-pocketing offences for 
passengers X, Y, and Z combined. For this paper an ICA score was calculated for each 
station and station segment using 5063 theft offences on the LU. An ICA score for each 
station was generated. This was further standardised as a rate (ICA adj*), by dividing 
the ICA score by the number of annual passenger journeys at each station. 
Predictor Variables 
A range of station features were selected as potential ‘internal’ predictor variables of 
theft including; station age and depth, gates and validators, ticket machines, lifts and 
escalators, amenities, staffing levels and number of platform (Table One). An OLS 
regression model revealed these variables were highly correlated with each other, and 
therefore some variables were removed to avoid multicollinearity errors (Table 1). A 
second OLS regression model confirmed those selected for further analysis were within 
acceptable statistical levels (VIF< 3.5, Tolerance >0.25). 
Table 1 
A range of potential ‘external’ predictor variables for theft were identified from the 
environs of stations including; socio-demographic data, accessibility measures based on 
roads and paths, nearby crime levels, and local land use (Table Two). An OLS 
regression model was again used to remove any highly correlated variables. As a final 
stage, a third OLS model combining both the internal and external predictor variables 
was generated, and any highly correlated variables were removed before further 
 
 
analysis. The variance inflation factor and tolerance scores revealed variables selected 
for further modelling were appropriate. 
Table 2 
A third possible theft predictor variable of theft, in addition to the internal and external 
predictor variables is ‘station type’ and this was captured and classified using three 
methods. The first was based on fare zone ranging from zone 1 to zone 6; stations in 
zone 1 are in the centre of the LU network, those in zone 6 on the outskirts. The second 
was a TfL classification of primary usage and location, namely; ‘City’; ‘Inner Suburb’; 
‘Outer Suburb’; ‘Shopping’; ‘Terminus’; and ‘Tourist’. The third method was an 
attractor/generator index (AGI) developed specifically for this paper.  
Preliminary analysis found considerable variation when comparing stations which 
experienced high counts of theft, and those stations which had high rates of theft (per 
million passenger journeys). Only ten stations were in the top twenty of all LU stations 
for both theft counts and theft rates. Furthermore, there was also considerable spatial 
variation in high risk stations by time of the day. Therefore the AGI was developed to 
separate stations into possible crime attractors (with high counts and rates of theft) and 
potential crime generators (with high counts of theft only). These were also subdivided 
further by those that experienced; high rates of theft at all times of the day; high theft 
rates but only at certain times of the day; and, low theft rates.  
Theft offences were broken down into six time periods; early (02.00-06:59); morning 
peak (07.00-09:59); inter-peak (10.00-15:59); afternoon peak (16.00-18:59); evening 
(19.00-21:59); and late (22.00-01:59). For all stations ICA and ICA adj* scores were 
calculated, across each of the six time periods. The AGI score devised was then used to 
 
 
classify stations into six types; AGI_1, high theft counts at all time periods; AGI_2, 
high theft rates at all time periods; AGI_3, high theft counts and high theft rates at all 
time periods; AGI_4, intermittently high theft counts and rates (at some but not all times 
of the day; AGI_5, intermittent medium theft rates and counts; and AGI_6, low risk of 
theft counts and rates. 
Modelling 
A series of negative binomial Poisson regression models were constructed. The 
dependent variable was theft at stations measured using the ICA, and this was regressed 
against a series of potential internal and external predictor variables. Preliminary 
analysis of the distribution of the ICA scores based on cumulative count data revealed 
this was highly skewed and over dispersed. Therefore negative binomial Poisson 
regression models were deemed appropriate (Hilbe, 2011) as used in a number of 
studies (Osgood, 2000; MacDonald and Lattimer, 2010; Bernasco and Block, 2011).  
Six models were constructed; model 1 considered internal characteristics, model 2 
external features, and model 3 combined internal and external variables. Three 
additional models were generated (4-6) to incorporate station type into the analysis, 
using fare zone, TfL classification, and the AGI score.  
The negative binomial Poisson models use theft counts rather than rates. The population 
at risk is accounted for through the use of an exposure measure, the offset variable. In 
this analysis, annual per million passenger journey counts at each station were used as 
the offset variable. Therefore passenger levels which may influence theft levels 
(Ceccato et al, 2013; Newton et al 2014) are included in the model but not as a direct 
predictor variable. The procedure for generating each model was; enter each predictor 
 
 
variable one at a time, significant variables are kept, and none significant variables are 
removed at each iteration stage. This was repeated for all predictor variables. At the end 
of this procedure, none significant variables are re-entered into the model to check if 
they influence the final model and re-included if significant.  
Results and Discussion  
Model 1 examined internal predictors of theft (Table 3) and variables found to have a 
statistically significant positive relationship with theft were; the number of lifts that are 
primary means of access to platforms; and the number of waiting rooms. Negative 
relationships were found for; station depth; the number of electronic gates; and, the 
number of platforms. In model 2 (Table 3) external variables found to positively 
influence theft were; the percentage of roads and paths near to stations; and high levels 
of theft nearby. Negative relationships were found between theft and; more domestic 
buildings nearby; and, high levels of violence against the person near to stations. The 
log likelihood, BIC and AIC values in models 1 and 2 showed they were both better 
predictors of theft than the baseline model 0 (stations offset by passenger numbers with 
no predictor variables). 
Table 3 
Model 3 combined both internal and external predictor variables of theft into a single 
model (Table 3). The log likelihood, AIC and BIC scores revealed model 3 was a better 
predictor of theft than models 1 and 2. There were some differences in identified 
predictor variables. In model 3, variables found to have a negative correlation with theft 
included; station depth; the number of personal validators; staffing levels; the number of 
platforms; and, more domestic buildings nearby. Variables shown to significantly 
 
 
increase theft were; the number of lifts which are primary access to platforms; waiting 
rooms; the percentage of roads and paths in nearby environs, and increased theft levels 
in the surrounding area.  
Models 4 to 6 incorporated station classification into the analysis. Fare zone was found 
to be none significant and removed. Model 4 analysed the TfL classification of station 
type and model 5 examined the AGI values. Model 6 combined TfL classification and 
AGI values (Table 4). In model 4 a significant positive relationship was found between 
theft and stations classed as ‘tourist’, and a negative relationship with ‘terminus’ 
stations. In model 5 a positive relationship was found between theft and AGI_3 stations 
(possible crime attractors), and a slightly negative relationship with AGI_5 stations 
(with intermittent medium levels of theft only at some times of the day). AGI_1 stations 
(possible crime generators) were also slightly positively correlated with theft. The final 
model (6) combined all three measures, the internal and the external predictor variables 
and station typology. The log likelihood, ACI and BCI scores revealed model 6 was a 
better predictor of theft than all previous models.  
Table 4 
From model 6 it was evident that predictor variables that reduce the risk of theft are; 
higher numbers of staff, personal validators, platforms, and shop rentals; more domestic 
buildings nearby; and stations classified as terminus stations. Potential explanations 
here are; that validators may reduce offender anonymity; increased staffing levels may 
increase possible detection and reduce anonymity of offenders; more platforms at 
stations may disperse passengers throughout the station and therefore victims are less 
concentrated; and, nearby domestic buildings might encourage more guardianship, or 
 
 
users may be familiar with the station and use it regularly thus be more aware of 
suspicious offender activity.   
Factors that increased the risk of theft below ground included; the number of lifts which 
are primary means of access to platforms; the number of waiting rooms; theft ‘at’ 
stations; the percentage of roads and paths in the nearby environs; nearby levels of theft; 
and stations identified as crime attractors. Potential explanations here are that; lifts and 
waiting rooms may concentrate persons in confined spaces; more roads and paths may 
increase accessibility and, or, increase the movement of persons to and away from an 
area; and, high levels of theft nearby, consistent with Newton et al, (2014) indicate a 
likely transmission of risk from inside a station to its external environs, and vice versa. 
Moreover, model 6 which incorporated internal characteristics, external variables, and 
station typology, was a better predictor of theft than other models, suggesting there is an 
interaction between the internal and external features that influence theft, and, therefore, 
it is argued that a transmission of theft risk does exist between underground stations and 
their nearby environs.  
There are a number of potential limitations with this analysis. The ICA technique may 
not accurately estimate likely locations of risk as it assumes that the risk at a segment 
between two stations, and the risk at a station are equal. Suggestions for future 
refinement of the ICA method are provided by Newton et al, (2014).  The AGI index 
could also be further refined and tested. The predictor variables used may not include all 
relevant variables, and external predictors are aggregated using census wards which 
may not representative of station environs. Recorded crime data is subject to under-
reporting, although it is contended under-reporting of theft is likely to be a universal 
problem across the entire LU, not skewing the ICA scores by individual stations. The 
 
 
analysis is based on the LU network and there may be errors due to spatial auto-
correlation. However, although the ICA scores are subject to a high degree of spatial 
auto-correlation, an examination of the ICA adj* (standardised per million passenger 
journeys) did not find such errors. The negative binomial Poisson regression models are 
offset by the passenger data thus it is not thought spatial autocorrelation errors are 
present.  
Conclusion 
This paper examined potential predictor variables of theft selected from the ‘internal’ 
settings of stations and their nearby ‘external’ environs. It combined the use of the 
innovative ICA measure for predicting underground theft at unknown locations and 
times, with negative binomial Poisson regression models to identify predictor variables 
of theft on the LU. Factors found to increase risk of theft were those that may encourage 
congestion of passengers within stations (lifts and waiting rooms), and those that 
increased levels of accessibility and access to stations (more paths and roads nearby). In 
contrast those that reduce theft were those likely to decrease anonymity and increase 
potential guardianship and offender detection (higher levels of staffing, personal 
validators, shop rentals, and more domestic buildings nearby), and those that disperse 
passengers throughout the station and avoid congestion (more platforms). Stations with 
higher theft levels in their surrounding environs, those identified as crime attractors 
(high theft counts and high theft rates), and stations with high levels of tourist use were 
at greater risk. Terminus stations were at lower risk. 
Policy implications and future avenues 
 
 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests offenders operate both inside the LU and 
near to underground stations. Indeed, even if different offenders are in operation at these 
two settings, at peak travel times this elevated risk occurs both within and near to high 
risk stations, thus deployment of resources, joint operations and shared intelligence 
between BTP, MPS and CoLP should be encouraged. The ICA technique can assist in 
identifying the location and times of high risk stations, and deployment at these times 
and places should focus on both settings, within stations and in their nearby environs, as 
both are subject to elevated risk levels. 
This paper presents evidence of a transmission of theft risk between the internal and 
external environments and vice versa, and therefore it is likely that barriers to 
movement between these settings (for example paid access gates) are perhaps not 
effective at deterring pick-pocketing offenders. An explanation offered by Newton et al, 
(2014) is that offenders are able to travel ‘unregistered’ on the LU using Oyster cards 
(plastic pre-paid travel cards) and all day travel cards, which can be bought with cash at 
automated machines. These travel cards are inexpensive for all day travel, and the price 
of travel may be small compared to the potential rewards of successful and undetected 
theft activity.  
The findings of this paper present a range of potential design solutions, for example 
increased accessibility outside stations and increased congestion within stations 
increases theft risk. However, any design alterations such as restricting accessibility 
may increase other crime types on the LU, or indeed impact negatively on user’s 
experience and feelings of safety. Moreover, features that increase or reduce theft risk 
are present both within the internal settings and in the nearby environs of stations, thus 
 
 
measures that address only internal or only external risk factors in isolation may not be 
effective in reducing theft.  
Further avenues for research  
The ICA technique should be further refined to better assign risk at stations and 
segments, for example based on journey time, platform length, carriage capacity, or 
other possible weightings of risk. A number of additional variables not currently 
captured could be incorporated into the model, for example line of sight, visibility, 
lighting, and CCTV. Better measures of nearby predictor variables could also be 
captured, for example within 250m of a station as opposed to entire census ward areas. 
Accessibility and congestion could be modelled using CCTV data for example to 
compare high and low risk stations for theft by different times of the day. The AGI 
index should also be refined, to develop better measures of crime attractors and crime 
generators for studies that examine crime at risky facilities.   
The ICA technique allows identification of stations that experience high and low levels 
of theft. This could be used to identify stations for further fieldwork, capturing 
information on the individual settings within a station, for example on platforms, on 
stairwells and escalators, to advance knowledge of which sections within a station are 
more at risk, and at which time of the day or day of the week. The ICA technique could 
also be used to evaluate the impact of prevention activity, for example deployment of 
plain clothed and uniform officers could be monitored and compared. The analysis 
presented here considers two settings, inside and near to stations. Stations could be 
further subdivided, for example Ceccato et al (2013) identified the following; the 
immediate vicinity; exits and entrances; lounges; transition areas; and platforms; and 
 
 
Newton et al, (2014) identified four alternative settings; near to but outside a station; 
inside a station but before the paid barrier control, within a station inside the paid 
barrier control including platforms, escalators and lounges; and on carriages themselves. 
It may be useful to examine theft against these more detailed settings in a refined model. 
Finally this study does not consider the items stolen. It may be useful to study theft 
offences by the type of property, as the increasing use of mobile technology and smart 
phones may be attractive to offenders, as a primary or secondary target as opposed to 
wallets, purses and their contents. There may be different patters observed by type of 
product stolen. Additionally changes to the network may impact on theft, for example 
current proposals on the LU to close three out of four ticket offices, extend services to 
24 hours, and increase Wi-Fi coverage on the network may actually impact on theft, and 
or other crime levels. Careful consideration should be given to the management of 
stations if such changes are introduced.   
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Table One: Potential predictor variables of theft – Internal station settings 
Predictor  Influence Selection  
Supplied by TfL 
  Passenger journey (per million passengers) CD Offset Variable 
N electric gates (new version) BM Y 
N pneumatic gates BM NMC 
N electric gates (old version) BM NMC 
N manual gates BM NMC 
N manual gates (1 off type) BM Y 
N wide aisle gates BM NMC 
N passenger validators BM Y 
N ticket halls FCG Y 
N waiting rooms FCG Y 
N cash machines FCG Y 
N shop rentals FCG Y 
N kiosk rentals FCG Y 
Station age (years) FCG Y 
Cycle racks (Yes/No) FCG Y 
Control room visible to passengers (Y/N) FCG Y 
Toilets (Y/N) FCG NNS 
N lifts where primary access CA Y 
N lifts where secondary access A Y 
N non-station lifts A NNS 
N stair lifts A NMC 
N escalators A Yes 
N passenger conveyors A NMC 
Station depth: average platform depth (m) A Y 
N tube platforms CA NMC 
N surface platforms CA Y 
N sub-surface platforms CA Y 
N island platforms CA NMC 
Estimated staffing levels (number) D Y 
Supplied by BTP 
  At station theft personal property: J04 OA Y 
At station shoplifting: J03 OA Y 
At station theft other: J22 OA Y 
Predictor: N=Number of 
Influence: CD=Congestion/Detection; BM=Barrier to Movement; 
FCG=Facilities/Congestion/Guardianship; CA=Congestion/Accessibility; A=Accessibility; 
DG=Detection/Guardianship; OA=Offender Activity 
Selection: Y=Yes; NNS= No, not significant, NMC= no, multi-collinearity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table Two: Potential predictor variables of theft – external nearby settings 
Predictor  Source Influence Selection  
Crime 
GLUD 
unless stated 
  Nearby station shoplifting (<400m) MPS/CoLP OA Y 
Nearby station other theft (<400m) MPS/CoLP OA Y 
Theft and handling rate (census ward) 
 
OA NNS 
Robbery rate (census ward) 
 
OA NNS 
VAP rate (census ward) 
 
OA Y 
SES characteristics (census ward) 
   Population density  
 
DC NNS 
Average house prices  
 
SES  NNS 
Index of Multiple Deprivation Score ONS FCG NNS 
LU- % domestic buildings  
 
FCG Y 
LU- % domestic gardens  
 
FCG NMC 
LU-% non-domestic buildings  
 
FCG NMC 
LU- % green space  
 
FCG NMC 
LU-% roads  
 
A Y 
LU- % rail  
 
A NMC 
LU % paths  
 
A Y 
LU - % other land use 
 
FCG Y 
% claiming incapacity benefits  
 
FCG NMC 
% claiming income support 
 
FCG Y 
% of Unauthorised school absence  
 
FCG Y 
% of young persons (<16)  
 
M Y 
% working persons  
 
M NMC 
% old  
 
M Y 
Predictor: LU = Land Use 
Source: MPS=Metropolitan Police Service; CoLP=City of London Police; GLUD=Generalised Land Use 
Database; ONS=Office National Statistics 
Influence: CD=Congestion/Detection; BM=Barrier to Movement; 
FCG=Facilities/Congestion/Guardianship; CA=Congestion/Accessibility; A=Accessibility; 
DG=Detection/Guardianship; OA=Offender Activity 
Selection: Y=Yes; NNS= No, not significant, NMC= no, multi-collinearity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table Three: Regression analysis: Internal and external characteristics of stations and 
theft 
  Model 1: Internal Only Model 2: External 
Model 3:  
Internal and External 
 Predictor variable B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig 
Approximate age 0 0.002 
    
- - 
 Station depth 
-0.01 0.003 *** 
   
-0.006 0.003 ** 
Electronic gates -0.036 0.009 *** 
   
- - 
 Manual gates -1.53 0.844 * 
   
-1.14 0.793 
 Personal validators -0.031 0.018 * 
   
-0.036 0.017 ** 
Lifts (primary access) 0.118 0.049 ** 
   
0.111 0.045 ** 
Lifts (secondary access) 0.063 0.042 
    
0.04 0.036 
 Staff  levels (estimated) -0.008 0.007 
    
-0.016 0.005 *** 
Sub surface platforms -0.168 0.06 *** 
   
-0.107 0.054 ** 
Surface platforms -0.167 0.049 *** 
   
-0.136 0.046 *** 
Ticket halls -0.054 0.13 
    
- - 
 Waiting rooms 0.151 0.08 * 
   
0.141 0.079 * 
Shop rentals -0.005 0.011 
    
-0.013 0.011 
 Kiosk rentals -0.054 0.062 
    
- - 
 Cycle racks 
-0.192 0.107 * 
   
- - 
 Control room -0.127 0.104 
    
- - 
 At station thefts -0.005 0.007 
    
0.001 0.006 
 Domestic buildings 
   
-0.047 0.015 *** -0.031 0.012 *** 
Road 
   
0.043 0.014 *** 0.039 0.012 *** 
Path 
   
0.22 0.062 *** 0.247 0.055 *** 
Other land uses 
   
-0.017 0.012 
 
-0.011 0.011 
 Children 
   
0.003 0.017 
 
0.013 0.014 
 Elderly 
   
0.008 0.023 
 
0.028 0.019 
 % Claim income support 
   
-0.034 0.032 
 
-0.026 0.025 
 % Unauthorised school 
Absence 
   
-0.037 0.187 
 
- - 
 Violence rate 
   
-0.002 0.001 ** - - 
 Shoplifting <250m 
   
-0.009 0.009 
 
-0.007 0.008 
 Theft person < 250m 
   
0.013 0.007 ** 0.011 0.006 * 
Other theft < 250m 
   
0.002 0.01 
 
-0.006 0.008 
 Constant 1.125 0.373 
 
-0.968 0.59 
 
-0.607 0.632 
 minus 2*LOG(lh) 1024.97 1023.42 944.258 
AIC 1170.532 1120.520 1031.237 
AICC 1173.313 1122.213 1036.149 
BIC 1172.56 1165.158 1106.779 
***99% significance; **95% significance, * 90% significance  
 
 
 
 
Table Four: Regression analysis: Internal and external characteristics of stations, 
station classification and theft 
 
Model 4 Model 5: Model 6 
Predictor variable B SE Sig B SE Sig B SE Sig 
Station depth -0.003 0.003 
 
-0.005 0.003 * -0.003 0.003 
 
Manual gates -1.218 0.766 
 
-1.002 0.771 
 
-1.107 0.753 
 
Personal validators -0.025 0.016 
 
-0.035 0.016 ** -0.027 0.015 * 
Lifts (primary 
access) 
0.103 0.041 ** 0.084 0.044 * 0.07 0.04 * 
Staff levels -0.018 0.005 *** -0.013 0.004 *** -0.016 0.004 *** 
Sub surface 
platforms 
-0.109 0.056 ** -0.147 0.052 *** -0.094 0.053 ** 
Surface platforms -0.101 0.044 ** -0.111 0.045 ** -0.087 0.043 ** 
Waiting rooms 0.128 0.075 ** 0.139 0.077 * 0.13 0.074 * 
Shop rentals -0.011 0.009 
 
-0.027 0.01 *** -0.02 0.009 ** 
At station thefts -0.001 0.005 
 
0.017 0.007 ** 0.012 0.006 ** 
Domestic buildings 0.033 0.016 ** -0.028 0.012 ** -0.018 0.01 * 
Roads 0.014 0.011 
 
0.033 0.012 *** 0.021 0.011 ** 
Paths 0.138 0.052 *** 0.217 0.052 *** 0.131 0.049 *** 
Other land uses -0.005 0.01 
 
-0.016 0.011 
 
-0.009 0.011 
 
Children 0.007 0.011 
 
0.016 0.011 
 
-0.011 0.011 
 
Elderly -0.008 0.011 
 
0.257 0.183 
 
0.023 0.019 
 
Shoplifting <250m -0.014 0.008 ** -0.004 0.008 
 
-0.009 0.007 
 
Theft Person < 
250m 
0.012 0.005 *** 0.009 0.006 
 
0.01 0.005 ** 
Other Theft < 250m -0.007 0.007 
 
-0.012 0.008 
 
-0.013 0.007 * 
AGI1 0.304 0.181 * - - 
 
0.207 0.174 
 
AGI2 0.066 0.174 
 
- - 
 
0.064 0.169 
 
AGI3 0.91 0.151 *** - - 
 
0.811 0.147 *** 
AGI4 0.083 0.14 
 
- - 
 
0.079 0.134 
 
AGI5 -0.219 0.118 * - - 
 
-0.21 0.117 * 
Tourist 
   
0.246 0.181 
 
0.351 0.163 ** 
Shopping 
   
0.021 0.203 
 
0.088 0.181 
 
Inner suburb 
   
0.027 0.196 
 
0.271 0.18 
 
Outer suburb 
   
-0.286 0.23 
 
-0.001 0.22 
 
Terminus 
   
-0.955 0.297 *** -0.55 0.276 ** 
Constant -0.855 0.602 -1.42 -0.689 0.636 
 
0.057 1.125 0.050 
minus 2*LOG(lh) 893.594 919.17 868.13 
AIC 964.9068526 989.283 947.472 
BIC 1050.749903 1075.126 1050.484 
***99% significance; **95% significance, * 90% significance  
